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New Forms and New Balances:
Organizing the External Relations of
the Unincorporated Firm
Robert W Hillman"
The sudden emergence of limited liability compames (LLCs) and
limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and the near umversal legislative
acceptance of these new vehicles for conducting business activities offer
valuable insights into legislative process and the extent to which state
legislatures bear -even a remote resemblance to deliberative bodies. Like
Diogenes wandering the streets of Athens, lantern m hand, searching for the
honest man, anyone seeking evidence of a debate among lawmakers over
the wisdom of limited liability or the cost-shifting consequences of LLCs
and LLPs is destined for disappointment.
Although debate over limited liability will not be found in the annals
of state legislatures, it will be found in the literature of law and economics.
The extent to which the literature truly informs us, however, is another
question. In An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the Limited Liability Com-
pany" Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition,' William W
Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery offer an insightful analysis of both the
literature of limited liability and the reasons why the LLC has achieved
such umversal and sudden legislative acceptance. As to the efficiency of
limited liability, Professors Bratton and McCahery conclude, with some
disappointment, that existing econolmc theory supports neither a presump-
tion for nor a presumption against limited liability Having found the
literature inconclusive on the issue of efficiency, they then consider whether
the widespread legislative acceptance of LLCs is itself an indication of the
efficiency of this new form of business association. Rejecting the idea that
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. Professor Hillman presented
this Introduction at the Washington and Lee University School of Law on November 15,
1996, in connection with The Future of the Umncorporated Firm Symposium.
1. William W Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the
Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition, 54 WASH.
& LEB L. REv 629 (1997).
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the legislative action in this area is a "race to the top" explainable by the
regulatory competition theory of efficiency, Bratton and McCahery con-
clude that the proliferation of LLC statutes is an indication of the legisla-
tures' responsiveness to a domestic interest group - the Bar.2
In Limited Liability and the Real World,3 Robert W Hamilton and
Larry E. Ribstem offer perspectives from cyberspace on the desirability of
limited liability In an interesting exchange of e-mail, Professors Hamilton
and Ribstem present sharply divergent views on the desirability of limited
liability Professor Ribstein argues, as he has in his earlier articles on the
subject,4 for the efficiency advantages of limited liability Professor Hamil-
ton questions whether creditors generally prefer limited liability to unlimited
liability I At the core of their debate is disagreement over the "real world"
and, in particular, whether credit generally is priced to reflect limited
versus unlimited liability
My own contribution to the Symposium is Limited Liability in Histon-
cal Perspective. Ignoring the historical perspective leads many commenta-
tors to excesses of excitement over what they regard as new and
pathbreaking developments. My Article shows that the quest for limited
liability and the development of trading and investment vehicles to achieve
this objective are ancient activities. To state the point more bluntly, the
"movement" of the last decade embracing limited liability offers little that
is truly new The wheel may have been restylized by placing a few new
spokes here and there, but the invention occurred some time ago.
Although virtually every jurisdiction has enacted LLC and LLP stat-
utes, the contributions to this Symposium illustrate the continuing interest
of academics in issues raised by the principle of limited liability This is
as it should be, for the suddenness with which the LLCs and LLPs ap-
peared should not obscure the very real, inportant policy issues raised by
laws that limited the liability of those engaged in business activities.
2. Tis represents an important extension and development of the authors' ideas on
interest rate capture expressed m William W Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory
Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV 1861
(1995).
3. Robert W Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstem, Limited Liability and the Real World,
54 WASH. & LEE L. REv 687 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstem, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death
of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992). My own difficulties with Professor
Ribstem's position are outlined in Robert W Hillman, Limited Liability and Externalization
of Risk: A Comment on the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 477 (1992).
5. In his discussion, Professor Hamilton builds on some of the themes he introduced
in Robert W Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnership: Present at the Birth
(Nearly), 66 U. CoLo. L. REv 1065 (1995).
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Limited Liability in Historical Perspective
Robert W Hillman"
The sudden emergence of new limited liability vehicles - notably
limited liability companies (LLCs) and limited liability partnerships
(LLPs) - suggests a revolution in the law of limited liability When placed
in histoncal perspective, however, the developments of the last decade can
be seen as more evolutionary than revolutionary Indeed, for as long as
commerce has existed, merchants, financiers, and others associated in
business activity have sought to eliminate, nmmize, and shift their losses
and liabilities. Often, those efforts have been reflected in the development
of associational relationships, grounded in contract or law, that bear a
striking resemblance to modem forms of business association, most notably
the limited partnership and its cousins, the LLP and the LLC.
This Article offers some Istorical perspective on both the quest for
limited liability and the responsiveness of the law to that quest.' Its ais
are modest, as is its length. No attempt is made to offer a comprehensive
history of limited liability, or even to identify the earliest point at which
limitations on liability were sought. To establish the point of the Article -
that the development of limited liability veicles is an ancient activity m the
law - it should be sufficient to sample the diverse periods in the develop-
ment of law and commerce when creative efforts to limit liability have been
revealed.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. Maxwell Taylor provided
valuable research assistance on this Article. This Article is based on an address presented
at the Washington and Lee University School of Law on November 15, 1996, m connection
with The Future of the Unincorporated Firm Symposium. 0 1997 by Robert W Hillman.
1. This Article focuses on attempts to achieve limited liability through means other
than the creation of corporations and related entities that shield their owners from liability
Contrary to popular perception, limited liability of shareholders did not flow automatically
from the entity status of their corporations. For a discussion of this point and the develop-
ment of limited liability for shareholders, see Phillip J. Blumberg, Limited Liability and
Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986). For a discussion of foreign antecedents and
counterparts to the LLC, see William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and
Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV 855 (1995).
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Tins brief survey begins with Roman law 2
I. Roman Law
Through the concept of noxal liability, Roman law recognized a form
of vicarious liability for torts (delicts).3 Interestingly, Roman law also
recognized a means of limiting such extended liability
Under Roman law, the paterfamilias - the head of the family - was
personally answerable for the torts of his child or his slave,4 but m either
case "possessed the singular privilege of tendering the delinquent's person m
full satisfaction of the damage." 5 The option of turning over the offending
family member or slave operated as an effective ceiling on damages and at
least m theory, if not in practice, was the functional equivalent of limited
liability 6
Extended liability m contract developed along somewhat different lines.
Under Roman law, the essence of the contractual obligation was personal, 7
which meant third parties could not be bound through contract, even if they
controlled one of the contracting parties. Such a norm acted as an unpedi-
ment to commerce, however, because it made conducting business through
other parties (agents) difficult, if not impossible. Eventually, Roman law
responded to meet the needs of the commercial environment in which it was
applied. One sign of that change was the development of the actio institona,
which allowed a claim against the "principal" for acts done by the "agent"
m the "course of the business." ' Although the application of the concepts
2. The choice of Roman law as a beginning point is convement but arbitrary. Agency
and partnership relationships, and liability problems arising from them, date to antiquity. See,
e.g., Henry F Lutz, Babylonian Partnership, 4 J. EcON. HIST. & Bus. 552, 563 (1932)
(discussing joint liability in Babyloman partnerships).
3. See JOSEPH A.C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 381-83 (1976).
4. At least from a contemporary perspective, this is appropriately described as "vicari-
ous" liability. Under the Roman view of the family, the liability may seem in some ways
more direct. Cf. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 129 (5th ed. 1888) ("At the outset,
the peculiarities of law in its most ancient state lead us irresistibly to the conclusion that it took
precisely the same view of the family group which is taken of individual men by the system
of rights and duties now prevalent throughout Europe.").
5. MAINE, supra note 4, at 140. On noxal liability in general, see ALAN WATSON, THE
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 274-80 (1965).
6. Finding expression in the Twelve Tables, noxal liability was grounded m early
Roman law. By the time of Justinian, the practice of surrendering children had been aban-
doned, leaving the delivery of the slave who caused an injury as the lingering remnant of this
early mode of limiting liability. WATSON, supra note 5, at 381.
7 For an overview, see David Johnston, Limiting Liability: Roman Law and the Civil
Law Tradition, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv 1515 (1995).
8. See WATSON, supra note 5, at 191-92.
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may have differed, the core ideas are quite recognizable to contemporary
business lawyers and merchants.
Over time, relatively advanced methods were developed to limit liability
in contract or for wrongful acts. 9 The most important of the techniques
employed the peculium, which achieved wide usage by the middle of Repub-
lican times. The peculium consisted of assets entrusted to a slave by his
master or to a son by Ins father.'" As the following description reveals, it
provided a way of achevmg limited liability m the conduct of business
affairs.
A slave or child in potestas could not own property themselves. How-
ever, where the slave, or son, traded with his peculium, as commercially
minded slaves were encouraged to do by their masters, debts and liabilities
incurred m such trading could only be enforced by third parties against the
master or paterfamilias to the extent of the peculium, and not against all
of the latter's property Thus, any Roman seeking to invest in a business
would trade through hIs slave or son and limit hIs liability by fixing the
size of the peculium. "
It appears that much commerce may have been conducted through
slaves:
[l]n commerce a slave can do much more for his master than an extrane-
ous free person could. A Roman with mercantile interests m Alexandria
9. See generally Johnston, supra note 7, at 1521-23.
10. The paterfamilias remained the owner of the property placed in the peculiun. See
ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PERSONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 98-100 (1967); see
also WATSON, supra note 5, at 188-89. He could not, however, withdraw property from the
peculium if the effect of such an action would be to defeat the claim of a creditor. See Alan
Watson, Thinking Property at Rome, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV 1355, 1365 (1993).
11. David L. Perott, Changes in Attitude to Limited Liability - The European Exper-
ence, in LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE CORPORATION 81, 86 (Tony Orhniol ed., 1982). The
following comments offer some insights into the peculium as a legal fiction:
Nothing, at first glance, is more diverse than the positions of a slave and the heir
to an estate. The one has to look forward only to a lifetime of service; the other,
at the death of his father, steps into his father's place in society. To the classical
jurist, however, both men were not only in the power of another but also specifically
under his patna potestas. Thus it was that, in classical times, the peculium or
property a Roman father would assign his grown son to administer and dispose of
on his own became an institution by which slaves could be assigned money, tools,
and even other slaves to manage independently for the slaveholder's profit. Because
the situation is foreign to us the fiction is patent and striking. In reality it is no
more striking than the modem rules that have created a variety of intellectual
properties - copyrights, patents, medical degrees, even personal likenesses - all
protected by the same remedies originally intended to protect cattle.
CHARLES M. RADDING, THE ORIGINS OF MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE 18 (1988).
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would, from a legal point of view, be well advised to have a slave agent
there rather than employ a free agent. The advantages of using the slave
were particularly great for acquiring rights under contracts. The use
that could be made of slaves, though it cannot be a full explanation, may
help to explain why there was apparently little pressure to create direct
agency 12
Because the master could withdraw property from the peculium at will,
the degree to which the slave shared the master's interest in the success of
the trading activities may not be apparent at first glance. For a variety of
reasons, however, the interests of the slave conducting business through the
peculium were aligned with those of the master so that the slave and master
shared the success of the venture. In particular, as Alan Watson points out:
"It was m the interest of masters and slaves alike that a master acquire the
reputation for allowing his slaves to buy their freedom with the peculiuin." 3
The peculium proved an excellent limited liability vehicle for conducting
business activities. 4 Over time, Roman law adapted to the inevitable de-
velopment of claims arising from activities associated with the peculium. By
the late Republic, for example, there developed a special form of action -
the actio de peculio et in rem verso - for the purpose of rendering the
paterfamilias liable for actions of the family subordinate to the extent of the
latter's peculium at the time of judgment and to the extent that the father's
estate had achieved a benefit under the transaction.'" Such an action was
particularly useful if the child or slave had secured an item using credit and
presented the item to the paterfamilias, and if at the time the debt was due
the peculium was insolvent. 16
12. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN SLAvE LAW 107-08 (1987).
13. Id. at 95. Watson asserts that "[i]f much in Roman law and life can be said to
dehumanize the slave, the peculium did much to humanize him." Id. (footnote omitted).
Specifically, he points to the peculium as a means for the slave to gain a stake m society,
education, and a measure of self-respect, not to mention freedom. Id.
14. See David V Snyder, The Case of Natural Obligations, 56 LA. L. REv 423, 429
(1995) ("The existence of the peculium m this circumstance made slaves particularly useful
for engaging in commerce because limited liability trading (liability being limited to the
peculium) was thus possible centuries before creation of the corporation."). Conducting
business through a peculium should be distinguished from a direct authorization of the son
or slave to conduct business on behalf of the father/master. With direct authorization,
liability ran to the "principal" by virtue of the grant of authority, but even here notice
through public advertisement of any limit on the authority of the "agent" served to limit the
liability of the principal in the event authority was exceeded. See THOMAS, supra note 3,
at 240-41.
15. See THOMAS, supra note 3, at 241.
16. Id.
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I1. Byzantine Chreokoinonta
The Rhodian Sea Law (Nomos Nautikos) was a collection of statutes
regulating, among other matters, the relative rights and duties of parties
involved in maritime trade. "7 Although the exact date is unknown, the Sea
Law likely was compiled between 600 and 800 A.D Within this same
general period, the Ecloga was developed as an effort to bring the Justinian
Code up to date to reflect practices of the time. Both the Sea Law and the
Ecloga reference the chreokononza, described by one scholar as the "the
most popular mediaeval contract to pool capitals in sea ventures." 18 The Sea
Law outlined the contract's use as follows:
A gives gold or silver for the service of partnership. The partnership is
for voyage, and he writes down as it pleases him till when the partner-
ship is to last. B, who takes the gold or the silver, does not return it to
A when the time is fulfilled, and it comes to grief through fire or robbers
or shipwreck. A is to be kept harmless and receive his own again. But,
if before the time fixed by contract is completed, a loss arises from the
dangers of the sea, it seemed good that they should bear the loss accord-
ing to their shares and to the contract as they would have shared m the
gain. 19
The chreokoinonia proved an important means of pooling capital in sea
ventures,' which had become risky affairs since the seventh century because
of raids by Arabian and Slavic pirates.2 Like a loan, it offered the passive
investor, A in the above model, the benefit of a limitation of liability to the
amount invested, but unlike a loan, it provided significant participation in the
profits from the venture. ' In the words of Robert Lopez, a leading scholar
on commerce of tlus era, the chreokoinonta "is justly regarded as having
been a sinew of mediaeval sea trade."'
17 See generally WALTER ASHBURNER, THE RHODIAN SEA-LAW (1909); Abraham L.
Udovitch, At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium?, 37 SPEC-
TRUM 198, 201-02 (1962).
18. Robert S. Lopez, The Role of Trade in the Economic Readjustment of Byzantium
m the Seventh Century, DUMBARTON OAKS PAPERS XIII 80 (1959), reprinted in ROBERT S.
LOPEZ, BYZANTIUM AND THE WORLD AROUND IT: ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL RELA-
TIONS, ch. X (1978).
19. RHODiAN SEA LAw, Part I, ch. 17, quoted in ASHBURNER, supra note 17, at 97
20. See generally Lopez, supra note 18, at 79-80.
21. See A.A. VASiLIEv, HISTORY OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE 248 (1952) (describing
piracy during period as "habitual phenomenon").
22. See Lopez, supra note 18, at 81.
23. Id.
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III. Early Islamic Law and Limited Liability
Particularly m its early development, Islamic law was merely an
extension of the Muslim religion, a factor that viewed alone might suggest
the development of legal norms not grounded in commercial necessity But
Arabs were perhaps the most sophisticated business people of the time, and
Mecca, the cradle of Islam, was also a thriving merchant community with
considerable commerce conducted among individuals residing in distant
locations.' Importantly, Islamic law was reformatory rather than preemp-
tory and did not displace custom and prevailing practices not inconsistent
with the precepts of the religion.
Turning to those essential precepts, the most authoritative source of
law - divine revelations to the Prophet Mohammed as set forth m the
QurAn - dictates that "[p]rofit goes with liability," meaning that only a
person willing to bear a risk of loss is entitled to claim a profit.' This
would hardly seem conducive to the development of partnerships m which
profits were to be shared disproportionate to liabilities. Yet that is exactly
what happened through a variety of techniques developed to limit liability 6
The first technique - the "licensed slave" - resembles the Roman
peculium discussed aboveY A business was launched upon a proclamation
of the master authorizing a slave to engage in business. The merchant/slave
was able to engage mn a wide variety of commercial activities, including
purchasing and selling goods on cash or credit, employing workers, and
incurring debt. Only the slave was responsible for clais arising from the
business. If the slave was unable to satisfy the claims from his earnings,
he could be sold, with the proceeds used to settle claims. Significantly, the
master was not responsible for claims and could even reclaim any identifi-
able goods that he had put in the business. At least one scholar has noted
24. See generally Alfred E. Lieber, Eastern Business Practices and Medieval European
Commerce, 21 EcoN. HIST. REv 230 (1968).
25. See generally S.W Hasanuzzaman, Limited Liability of Shareholders: An Islauc
Perspective, 28 ISLAMIC STUD. 353 (1989).
26. The flexibility allowed in merchants m this regard was attributable to the lack of
guidance on commercial matters provided in the Qurn:
It might have been expected that the Qur'an, given the alleged unportance of trade
during the Prophet's lifetime and m the growing Muslim community should, at
least, have formed a skeletal code of obligations concerning commercial transactions.
This was not the case, for those regulations governing commerce that are to be found
in the Qur'an are more like paradigmatic "occasional hints" than clear instructions, and
must be sifted out from among the usually lengthy passages of general exhortations.
S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 80 (1991).
27 See Hasanuzzaman, supra note 25, at 358-59.
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the "remarkable affinity" between the Islamc institution of the licensed
slave and more modem European limited liability vehicles.'
A second and more important means of achieving limited liability was
the qirffd,29 whlch is not mentioned in the Qurn or the traditions of the
prophet. Our knowledge of this associational form is drawn from a chapter
on the qzr.d found m MRlik's Muwatta,3" which reflects practices of Arabia
m the eighth century, if not earlier.3" As described by Mdlik, the qtrffd was
created from a profit-sharing arrangement in which a "man [the merchant]
takes money from his colleague [the investor] in order to work with it
without any liability to himself." The investor could not stipulate that
liability would be borne by the merchant. The merchant had complete
discretion on trading policy, but the investor could assert control over
broader matters such as the nature of goods that the merchant could buy
and sell and the locations where the agent could travel. Profits were evenly
divided between the merchant and the investor, although the parties could
agree on different proportions that each would share. As so described, the
qirffd presents an interesting twist on the modem limited partnership, in
which it is the passive investor rather than the active manager that enjoys
the benefits of limited liability
IV Medieval Trading and Investment Vehicles
A. The Commenda
The appearance of the commenda in eleventh century Italy is a mile-
stone in the history of limited liability All serious attempts to trace the
28. Id. at 359. Hasanuzzamian adds:
In the former case a master authorizes the slave, who is his personal asset, to do
business; in the later case the shareholders subscribe a part of the personal assets to
form a company and authorize it to conduct trade. In the same manner as the master
of the licensed slave is not held responsible for the liabilities incurred by the slave, so
too is the shareholder not responsible for the liability incurred by the company.
Id.
29. Tls discussion of the Islamic qirgd is drawn largely from Udovitch, supra note 17,
at 202-06.
30. The Muwatta, which dates to the late eighth century, is an early compilation of
Islamic law that includes a digest of opinions of scholars as well as commentary by Malik.
31. Indeed, it appears that the qirid was a popular and important form for conducting
commercial activities in pre-Islamic Arabia. See RAYNER, supra note 26, at 72-73. The qtr&d
is also known as the Mudgraba. An alternative to the qzri4 was the partnership grounded in
contract, or Mush ifraka, also prevalent m pre-Islamc Arabia. A variety of more specialized
relationships having some partnership characteristics were also recogmzed in both pre- and
post-Islanue Arabia. See generally id. at 74-75; S.M. Hasanuzzaman, The Liability of
Partners in an Islamc Slurkah, J. ISLAMIC REs. INST., Dec. 1971, at 319.
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origins of modem limited liability vehicles trace the line of development
back at least to the commenda. But the commenda had its own roots, and
m ths form of business association can be seen the influence of earlier legal
and commercial cultures, some of which are discussed above. 2 The link
between the Islamic qird and the commenda seems particularly strong:
The qirad, it can unequivocally be stated, is the earliest example of a
commercial arrangement identical with the later commenda, and contain-
ing all its essential features. Whether the qzrdd was taken over wholesale
by Italian sea merchants and transformed into the commenda or evolved
independently to meet a need created by commercial expansion is some-
thing which cannot be stated with certainty However, even in the
darkest period of the Dark Ages trade between the Catholic West and the
Muslim World did not come to a complete standstill. The political and
economic contacts between Islam and the West dunng the eighth, ninth,
and tenth centuries offered Western merchants numerous and convement
opportunities to learn and adopt commercial techniques and practices
from their more advanced Eastern colleagues.
33
Used largely for sea trade,' the commenda had many of the character-
istics of the modem limited partnership.35 One party (the passive, or
32. See, e.g., ROBERT S. LOPEZ & IRVING W RAYMOND, MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE
MEDIrERRANEAN WORLD 174 (1955) ("Precedents to the commenda have been found m the
Babylonian tappulim contract, m the Muslim [qird], m the Byzantine chreokoinonia, and,
less convincingly or less directly, m the Greek and Roman sea loan and other contracts of
the Hellemstic-Roman world, or even m certain Germanic agrarian contracts."). The origins
of the commenda is the subject of intense debate among scholars.
33. Udovitch, supra note 17, at 207 Robert Lopez suggested that the commenda
evolved from the Byzantine chreokoinonia. See Lopez, supra note 18, at 80. The qtrffl
developed at roughly the same time as the chreokoinonia, and both saw their primary uses
in the pooling of capital for sea trade. This Article accomplishes conciseness at the expense
of completeness by omitting discussion of a third means of pooling capital, the Jewish 'isqa,
which strongly resembled the chreokomnonia. On the 'isqa, see Udovitch, supra note 17,
at 199-201.
34. Until the mid-thirteenth century, the sea loan was an important alternative to the
commenda. Both the sea loan and the comienda utilized the capital of the passive investor,
but in the sea loan the risk of loss from misfortune at sea (principally piracy or shipwreck)
was borne by the investor/lender. The investor/lender and the merchant were not m
partnership, and there was no sharing of business risks. If the ship arrived safely in port,
the debt under the sea loan was due m its entirety Not surprisingly, the sea loan carried
a high return, with payments due on voyage completion often 40 % to 50 % greater than the
amount loaned. Sea loans were dealt a serious blow in 1236, when Pope Gregory IX
condemned them as usurious. On sea loans, see generally 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF EUROPE 53-55 (M. Postan et al. eds., 1963).
35. This description of the commenda is drawn from LOPEZ & RAYMOND, supra note
32, at 174-76.
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sleeping, partner) would provide capital to another party (the traveling, or
managing, partner) to finance an overseas commercial venture. The manag-
ing partner, who did not necessarily provide capital but did assume the risk
of a dangerous voyage, would have responsibility for all aspects of manage-
ment of the venture.36 The commenda would terminate upon completion of
the venture, at which time the parties would divide profits under a pre-
determined formula.37 Typically, three-fourths of the profits went to the
passive partner with the traveling partner receiving only one-fourth. It has
been observed that "[t]his arrangement may seem unfair, but in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries life was cheap and capital scarce."38
One of the great advantages of the commenda was that the passive
investor enjoyed limited liability Indeed, it appears that third parties doing
business with the managing partner were generally unaware of the existence
of the passive partner.39 The establishment of the commenda as an accepted
form of investment enabled passive investors to diversify their investments
by placing money in several commendae rather than placing large bets on
single voyages.' Over time, diversification against the risks of sea voyages
joined literary appeal with economic advantage. Shakespeare opens The
Merchant of Venice with the merchant Antomo wondering aloud why he is
36. This meant that "the major direction of a voyage was m the hands of the mer-
chants, not of the shipowners, one of the characteristic differences between medieval and
modern shipping." E.H. BYRNE, GENOESE SHIPPING IN THE TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH
CENTURIES 36 (1930), quoted in 3 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note
34, at 59.
37 See ARMANpO SAPORI, THE ITALIAN MERCHANT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 43 (P
Kennem trans., 1970) (noting that upon completion of voyage new venture would be
formed, "sometimes with the same members, but usually with different ones").
38. 3 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note 34, at 50.
39. A marked development in contemporary limited partnership law has been the
relaxation of restrictions on the extent the limited partner can be active in the business and
still enjoy the benefits of limited liability It seems quite the opposite trend prevailed as
use of the commenda grew:
Early commenda agreements usually left to the investor the right of deciding
the destination, choice of ship, and other essentials of the commercial venture
undertaken by the traveling party They also insisted on meticulous accounting
and often specified that the goods should go and return m the custody of the
traveling party In time, however, greater and greater latitude was left to the
traveling merchant. Evidently, it was impossible for the sedentary investor to
control adequately the management of the venture without hampering the initia-
tive of the traveling party; nor were all merchants willing to accept limitations
from investors.
LOPEZ & RAYMOND, supra note 32, at 176.
40. See 3 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note 34, at 53.
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so sad.4" Perhaps, his friends suggest, his mind is tossing on the ocean in
anxiety over the fate of hIs investments. Surely, they suggest, Antomo "is
sad to think upon his merchandise."'42 Anticipating modem portfolio
theory, Antomo responds:
Believe me, no. I thank my fortune for it,
My ventures are not in one bottom trusted,
Nor to one place; nor is my whole estate
Upon the fortune of thus present year,
Therefore my merchandise makes me not sad. 3
Interestingly, contemporary scholars who argue in favor of limited liability
cite the same diversification benefits.'"
B. The Compagma
For overland rather than sea trade, the compagnia was used in place
of the commenda.45 For the most part, the differences between the two
modes of association are explained by the special perils associated with
trade by sea, where the commenda was used. In contrast to the commenda,
the compagnia did not limit the liability of the passive investor.'" The
background of the distinction provides an interesting lesson in the develop-
ment of forms for doing business:
This collective responsibility may have been originally a legacy of
the time when the compagnia really was, as the name indicates, a non-
commercial association of members of the same family eating the same
bread and working for the same increase of the common patrmony But
liability remained unlimited when the "table companions" because mer-
chants often unrelated by blood, no doubt because third parties were
averse to dealing with a member of a company unless all partners shared
full responsibility with the latter. Consequently any partner could rum
41. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 1, se. 1 (Jay L. Halio
ed., Clarendon Press 1993) (1596-97).
42. Id. at 1. 40.
43. Id. at 11. 41-45. The play, or course, was post-medieval, but at least as to views
on diversification presumably reflects attitudes held in earlier times.
44. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L. REV 89, 96-97 (1985).
45. Only rarely was the commenda used for overland trade. See 3 CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note 34, at 49.
46. SAPORI, supra note 37, at 42-43 ("In these companies the members' personal
fortunes were also at stake since they were held responsible for all and jointly with their
fellow members in the case of bankruptcy ").
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completely the others by a poor speculation, and the risks increased with
the number of new partners admitted to the company I
Although some commentators regard the unlimited liability associated
with the compagnia as an advantage of this form of organization,' it is
noteworthy that the limited liability option was not made available, or at
least was not exercised, for trade other than by sea. This is not for lack of
commercial sopustication. Banking and industry were well developed in
inland cities, and the essential characteristics of the commenda were cer-
tainly known to Inland merchants and financiers. A partial answer for why
limited liability was not a feature of partnerships engaged m overland trade
may be found in the use of insurance as a means of limiting certain risks.
Indeed, from at least the mid-fourteenth century there is evidence of
premum-based insurance activity,4 9 and there are examples of compagma
contracts mandating insurance coverage.5' It is doubtful, however, that a
compagma arrangement combined with insurance limited risks to the same
extent as a commenda, and the limited liability associated with the com-
menda should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule for the time.
C. A Case Study: The Failed Attempt of the Bonsignore
Compagma to Achieve Limited Liability
The Bonsignore partnership of Siena was one of the great merchant-
banking concerns of the thirteenth century Originally operated as a family
firm, the partnersip grew to include twenty-three partners, eighteen of
whom were not members of the Bonsignore family Over time, internal
47 2 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 324 (M. Postan & E.E. Rich eds.,
1952) [hereinafter 2 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE].
48. See, e.g., SAPORi, supra note 37, at 43. Sapon adds:
The mutual trust and long-calculated efforts which could reduce risks to a
minimum and lead to happy results favored unlimited liability In addition, a
prolonged activity m common directed toward the same ends demanded of the
members a reciprocal confidence and esteem and frequent consultation. It
unplied the other basic principle of the company; that of shared responsibility
This total solidarity in bearing responsibility conferred on the administration a
particular prestige m its dealings with outsiders.
Id.
49. See 3 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note 34, at 99.
50. See, e.g., LOPEZ & RAYMOND, supra note 32, at 206-11 (discussing contract
providing that merchant partner "insure or cause to be insured fully all wool, cloth, or other
merchandise that may be shipped anywhere on behalf of said compagnia, no matter in what
ship it shall be loaded, with the exception that if he should ship by Florentine or Venetian
galleys he may take a risk up to £60 groat in each galley and no more").
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 615 (1997)
dissension crippled the business operations of the firm.5 Attempting to
secure relief from creditor demands, the partnership sought the intervention
of mumcipal authorities, requesting (in part) the following assistance:
That it may please you to see to it that two ambassadors of the Commune
of Siena go to the lord pope and speak m behalf of said societas, and that
he [the pope] use the influence of his holy office with the creditors of
said societas to the end that, m presenting their demands, these
creditors may not burden the partners of the societas except in the pro-
portion that falls to each one 52
The petition was denied, and the firm failed. Perhaps as a result of the
Bonsignore experience, Siena adopted the concept of proportional liability
in later statutes. In the view of some scholars, the statutes, which were
subsequently repealed, contributed to the decline of Siena as an Important
business center.53
V To the Present
Had its troubles occurred a century or more later, the Bonsignore
partnersip may have fared better. In 1408, Florence enacted a statute that
allowed the creation of societa in accomandite, or limited partnerships,
the essential characteristic of which was that passive partners were liable
only to the extent of their investments.' From tis point, one can easily
trace the development of limited partnerships to the French sociNtt en
commandite, incorporated in French law first at the time of Louis XIV m
1671 and then in the Code de Commerce of 1806.55 Widely used in
51. This description of the Bonsignore partnership is drawn from 3 CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note 34, at 67, 75.
52. The translated text of the petition, which was dated August 9, 1298, may be found
m LoPEz & RAYMOND, supra note 32, at 298, 301 (emphasis added).
53. See Robert S. Lopez, Italian Leadership in the Medieval Business World, 8 J.
ECON. HisT. 63, 66 (1948) (expressing agreement with Armando Sapon on this point and
adding, "this clause, conservative as it may seem to us, was partly responsible for the rapid
decline of Siena as a leading center of business. The public wanted to nail solidly each and
all of the partners to each and all of the partnership's debts.").
54. There is evidence that this form of business association was actually used earlier.
See 2 CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note 48, at 347 ("A scholar has
found in a Barcelonese contract of 1332 closer resemblance to the modem socitd en
accomandite than can be noticed m the commenda or the compagnia contracts most com-
monly used m Italy m the same period."). But cf FERNAND BRAUDEL, 2 CIVILIZATION AND
CAPITALISM 15TH-18TH CENTURY: THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE 438 (S. Reynolds trans.,
1982) (noting that first recorded accomandita contract dates from 1532).
55.- The socigtg en commandite was well established long before the development of
the Code de Commerce. See, e.g., REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF
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France,56 the soactg en commandite was the model for the Irish Anonymous
Partnersip Act of the late eighteenth century 7 and early American limited
partnership statutes, the first of which was enacted by New York in 1822.8
And so ends tis brief survey of the history of limited liability, which
should at least be sufficient to show that the development of vehicles for
achieving limited liability in business ventures is an ancient activity Of
course, there is much more to the story of limited liability For example,
this discussion has ignored England, where limited liability developed along
a different line and at a slower pace than occurred on the Continent. 9 The
nineteenth century presents a particularly interesting chapter in the English
story because of the level of the debate that occurred over the desirability
of limited liability Specifically, in the 1837 Report on the Law of Partner-
ship, prepared by H. Bellenden Ker at the direction of the Board of Trade,
and m the 1851 Report from the Select Committee on the Law of Partner-
ship, prepared at the direction of the House of Commons, we can more
than a century later find a level of inquiry, a quality of debate, and an
awareness of history that is largely absent from contemporary discussions
of limited liability
PARTNERSHIP 32 (1851) (statement of M. Labouchere).
56. One reason the commandite associational form proved so popular was that
members of the nobility could invest as silent partners. See BRAUDEL, supra note 55, at'439
("This undoubtedly explains the success of the commandite system m France, where those
who were 'in trade' were still not readily admitted to high society, even during the business
explosion of the eighteenth century Paris was not London or Amsterdam.").
57 21 & 22 Geo. 3, ch. 46 (Irish). Apparently, the limited partnerships allowed by
the Irish Act were not very popular. As to why, consider the following comments:
[In contrast to the French New York experiences, the effect m Ireland has
been that] after 50 years experience, it appears that few persons have availed
themselves of the provisions of the Act allowing limited partnerships, the provi-
sions of which are somewhat similar to the French law, except that the duration
of these partnerships is limited to 14 years, and the nmmum capital is 1,000 1.
and the maximum 50,000 1.
It has been suggested that the risk attending any accidental noncompliance
with the strict and minute provisions of the Act has been the cause of deterring
the Irish capitalists from availing themselves of this law.
H. BELLENDEN KER, REPORT ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 21 (1837).
58. See 1822 N.Y LAWS., 45th Sess., ch. CCXLIV
59. See generally LIMITED LIABILrrY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 11, at 96-

